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1 Introduction
Recent events have refocused the interest of regulatory authorities and accounting
standard setters on the effectiveness of the established regulatory and accounting
framework for banks, particularly in a context of increasing international harmo-
nization regarding these issues. In the context of loan loss accounting for banks,
some of the discussion touches crucially on the long-standing debate regarding
what level of discretion is the most appropriate. Accounting standard setters, as
stressed by Benston and Wall (2005), appear to largely prefer rules to discretion in
order to assure transparent, unbiased loan-loss reporting for general-purpose users
of financial statements, such as investors. Bank supervisors, on the other hand, are
predominantly concerned with assuring that banks are adequately capitalized and
can efficiently fulfill their financial intermediation role, without opposing bank
managers’ accounting discretion per se.1 This is in line with the established view
of Watts and Zimmerman (1986, 1990) that such discretion could either be wealth
enhancing for all contracting parties, or alternatively make the manager exercising
the discretion better off at the cost of some of the other contracting parties.2
While there is an extensive literature on discretionary behavior in loan loss
provisioning,3 this paper focuses on the loan charge-off behavior of banks which
can have similarly important discretionary elements, but has been previously stud-
ied to a lesser extent. One strand of the existing theoretical and empirical litera-
ture has focused on the Japanese banking crisis in the 1990s. Cargill et al. (1997)
argue that Japan’s government adopted regulatory forbearance, e.g. relaxation
of bank capital requirements, in order to "buy time" during the collapse of its
real estate and stock market bubbles. Japanese banks delayed charging off non-
1This motivates, e.g., the current discussions between the Basel Committee on Banking Super-
vision and the International Accounting Standards Board regarding the possible implementation
of forward-looking loan loss provisioning systems to reduce the procyclicality of bank lending,
which would however require a reform of the Fair Value Accounting system based on IAS 39
(Basel Committee on Bank Supervision, 2009).
2More generally, the first type of discretion is thus welfare enhancing in a Pareto sense, while
the second is not.
3See e.g. Anandarajan et al. (2007) for a survey.
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performing loans, and even engaged in "forbearance lending" where banks extend
further loans to troubled borrowers in the hope that economic conditions might re-
cover (Baba, 2001; Sekine et al., 2003; Chen and Chu, 2003; Peek and Rosengren,
2005; and Schüle, 2007).
However, discretionary behavior in banks’ loan charge-off decisions is not
necessarily confined to crisis episodes like the Japanese one. A related empirical
literature highlights that US banks might have used discretionary loan charge-offs
for capital management purposes prior to the 1989 regulatory change in bank cap-
ital ratio determination (Moyer, 1990; Beatty et al., 1995; Collins et al., 1995; and
Kim and Kross, 1998). Net charge-offs are deducted from loan loss reserves,4
which formed then part of primary capital; thus banks were able to decrease net
charge-offs in order to increase their regulatory capital. For banks this represented
a less costly way to increase regulatory capital than raising equity or decreasing
risk exposure; for a regulator, on the other hand, this amounts to a "fictitious" in-
crease in regulatory capital, and would therefore be undesirable. These incentives
have since been severely reduced, as loan loss reserves from Basel I onwards enter
at most into Tier 2 capital (Laurin and Majnoni, 2003).5
Alternatively, Liu and Ryan (2006) highlight a potential income smoothing
objective related to discretionary loan charge-offs. Banks may have incentives to
smooth their income in order to reduce investors’ and regulators’ perception of
their risk, or due to bank managers’ concerns about their job security (Fudenberg
and Tirole, 1995). Banks could achieve such income smoothing by understat-
ing (overstating) their loan loss provisions when earnings are expected to be low
(high) relative to their average earnings over the cycle. They could then attempt
to obscure this behavior by trying to minimize fluctuations in loan loss reserves,
in order to avoid regulatory and market scrutiny. This could be achieved through
4Note the accounting identiy: (loan loss reserves) = (loan loss provisions) + (lagged loan loss
reserves) - (loan charge-offs).
5The Basel I accord allowed general loan loss reserves to count toward Tier 2 capital up to a
maximum of 1.25% of risk-weighted assets. For banks using the IRB approach, Basel II changed
this limit to 0.6% of credit-risk-weighted assets.
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exercising discretion over loan charge-offs, e.g. by accelerating charge-offs to off-
set higher loan loss provisions to keep loan loss reserves unchanged. As discre-
tionary loan charge-off behavior motivated in this way essentially aims to deceive
both regulators and investors, it would be deemed undesirable by both regulatory
authorities and accounting standard setters.
In this paper, we add another aspect to this literature by stressing that discre-
tion over the timing of charging off a non-performing loan could be economically
justified in the following scenario: (i) there remains a positive probability the loan
will be ultimately repaid, which might plausibly depend on general economic
conditions, and (ii) the value of the potentially reclaimed collateral and the dead-
weight costs associated with loan foreclosure are similarly uncertain. To examine
how variability in the market for collateral and general economic conditions can
influence banks’ discretionary behavior in loan charge-offs, we develop a stylized
real options model of a bank’s (optimal) decision whether or not to foreclose on
and charge off a currently non-performing secured loan when there is the chance
of full loan recovery and the expected present value of the potentially reclaimed
collateral, minus the deadweight costs of loan foreclosure, are uncertain.6
We demonstrate, in line with real options theory, that the bank proves less
willing to pursue the process of loan foreclosure and charge-off than in the clas-
sical certainty case. We further show that increased uncertainty about the bank’s
expected discounted loss from foreclosing on and charging off the loan, e.g. stem-
ming from variability in the market for collateral, increases the bank’s tendency to
delay this process. An increased probability of loan recovery, as possibly driven
by better general economic conditions, can either reduce or, more intuitively, in-
crease the bank’s willingness to delay the loan foreclosure and charge-off process,
depending on the degree to which economic conditions affect the trend in the mar-
6Baba (2001), in the context of the Japanese banking crisis, also uses a real options approach to
examine the effects of uncertainty on banks’ loan charge-off decisions; however, he focusses on the
possible implementation of a government subsidy scheme and uncertain reputational repercussions
from writing off non-performing loans as key driving factors instead. For standard treatments of
real options methodology, see e.g. McDonald and Siegel (1986) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
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ket value of collateral.
Allowing a bank to exercise discretion in the timing of charging off a non-
performing loan is, in this context, equivalent to letting it properly take into ac-
count the real options value implicit in the loan charge-off decision. A welfare
maximizing regulator might thus want to let banks pursue this kind of discre-
tionary loan charge-off behavior, with the obvious problem of distinguishing it
from the one stemming from the capital management and income smoothing ob-
jectives, while a more rules-focused accounting standards setter would presum-
ably not.
We test empirically the hypothesis that banks, if otherwise unconstrained,
might have discretionary behavior regarding loan charge-offs that is related to
variability in the market for collateral and general economic conditions, consistent
with the real options perspective taken above. In the United States, bank regula-
tory guidance dictates when most loans have to be charged-off, e.g. no later than
180 days for residential mortgages (the most common collateralized loan type),
leaving little room for such discretionary behavior. In Europe, on the other hand,
absence of strict rules regarding the timing of loan charge-offs is pervasive. We
therefore test our implied hypothesis of "uncertainty dependence" in discretionary
loan charge-offs using a panel of European banks over the period 1994 to 2005,
controlling for the two alternative types of discretionary loan charge-off behavior
motivated by capital management and income smoothing objectives.
Our results confirm the existence of a discretionary, uncertainty-related factor
in European banks’ loan charge-off behavior, which is consistent with the main
features highlighted in our theoretical model. Our results further suggest the pos-
sibility that European banks might be smoothing their income while attempting
to obscure this behavior through matching discretionary loan charge-offs. Capital
management, on the other hand, does not seem to play a significant role in the
loan charge-off behavior of European banks.
Section 2 now develops the model and discusses its results; section 3 describes
and discusses our empirical analysis; and section 4 concludes the paper.
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2 A stylized model of loan charge-offs under uncer-
tainty
We consider a stylized model of a bank holding a secured loan which in its cur-
rent non-performing state has an expected present value of N  1; the expected
present value of the loan in its performing state is normalized to one. The bank
faces the binary decision problem to either foreclose on and charge off this non-
performing loan now, or to wait and see if the loan recovers. We assume that the
bank is otherwise unconstrained, i.e. we abstract from accounting and/or regula-
tory requirements; we also assume that the bank’s only objective is to maximize
the expected payoffs from that loan, i.e. it does not engage in income smoothing
or capital management. These simplifications allow us to focus on the impact of
uncertainty on the bank’s loan foreclosure and charge-off decision, which would
be more difficult to isolate in a more complex, if possibly more realistic, frame-
work.
If the bank does go ahead with the process of loan foreclosure and charge-
off, the expected present value of the potentially reclaimed collateral, minus the
deadweight costs associated with loan foreclosure, are assumed to be given by
RC  1. We can then define the bank’s expected discounted loss if it does not
immediately foreclose on and charge off the loan as Ln D 1  N (reflected in the
amount of loan loss reserves set aside through loan loss provisions), and the cor-
responding expected discounted loss if it does proceed with the loan foreclosure
and charge-off process as Lw D 1  RC (reflecting the resulting net charge-off).
To represent the non-performing loan’s chance of recovery, the bank’s ex-
pected discounted loss while postponing the process of loan foreclosure and charge-
off is assumed to follow the jump process d Ln D  Lndq , where dq is the incre-
ment of a Poisson process such that dq D 1 with positive probability dt . This
downward Poisson jump thus represents the chance of a full loan recovery, with
mean arrival time  1; this would generally depend on economic conditions.7
7One could e.g. imagine a borrower’s financial situation being turned around by the arrival of
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On the other hand, as the value of the potentially reclaimed collateral and the
deadweight costs associated with loan foreclosure are also uncertain, the bank’s
expected discounted loss from foreclosing on and charging off the loan is assumed
to follow the geometric Brownian motion d Lw D LwdtC Lwdz.8 In this speci-
fication, the trend rate  is modelled as  D  , where  is a collateral-specific
trend rate, adjusted for "economic conditions" as proxied by a linear function of
the Poisson parameter , with   0. Furthermore,  2 is the variance rate, and
dz  NID.0; dt/ is the increment of a Wiener process with E.dzdq/ D 0, imply-
ing that changes in future values of expected discounted losses from pursuing the
process of loan foreclosure and charge-off are lognormally distributed, with the
variance of their levels increasing in the time horizon.
The bank’s choice problem then involves the comparison of the respective
expected discounted losses from either delaying or going ahead with the process
of foreclosing on and charging off the non-performing loan, taking the option
value of waiting into account. Formally, the bank’s decision implies solving the
Bellman equation for the optimal stopping problem
F.Ln; Lw/ D max

Ln   Lw ; 1
dt
E[d F.Ln; Lw/]

(1)
where  > 0 is the appropriate risk-adjusted or discount rate, and F.Ln; Lw/ is
the value of the option to foreclose on and charge off the non-performing loan,
with Ln   Lw the expected discounted benefit from pursuing the loan foreclosure
and charge-off process.9 We can then derive the trigger value for the bank’s option
exercise as
new orders or contracts, a mechanism that could be reasonably represented by a Poisson process
in this way.
8The expected discounted loss from pursuing the loan foreclosure and charge-off process, Lw,
is heavily dependent on the value of potentially reclaimed collateral, which, as an asset price, could
arguably be reasonably represented by a geometric Brownian motion. The combination of Poisson
and geometric Brownian motion processes has furthermore the technical advantage of allowing a
closed-form solution to the bank’s optimization problem.
9Note that Lw and Ln represent expected discounted losses.
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Proposition 1 The bank will want to exercise the option to foreclose on and
charge off the non-performing loan if
Ln
Lw


Ln
Lw

D
 2   2 C 4 .C /C
q
8 .C /  2 C  2    22
4 .C / > 1
for C  > 0, where  D   and  2 are the (adjusted) trend and variance
rate of the bank’s expected discounted loss from foreclosing on and charging off
the loan,  is the discount rate, and  the probability of loan recovery.
Proof. See Appendix.
If the current ratio of expected discounted losses LnLw exceeds (or is equal to)
the critical or trigger value

Ln
Lw

derived in Proposition 1, the bank will want
to exercise the option to foreclose on and charge off the non-performing loan
instantaneously. If LnLw <

Ln
Lw

, however, it will prefer to leave this option
unexercised for the time being, i.e. display discretionary behavior by holding
off on the foreclosure and charge-off process. As this trigger value is strictly
(and potentially substantially) greater than one, the bank proves less willing to
foreclose on and charge off the non-performing loan than in the classical certainty
case.10 This inertia is a natural consequence of the real options nature of the
decision problem involved, and stems from the interaction of uncertainty about
the payoffs from and irreversibility in the bank’s loan foreclosure and charge-off
decision.
We further examine how the inertia arising from the real options nature of the
loan charge-off decision depends on the different underlying structural parameters
of our model, resulting in
Proposition 2 The comparative statics effects of changes in  , , , ,  and 
10Note that

Ln
Lw
 D 1 in this case.
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(where  D    ), on the trigger value of relative expected discounted losses
Ln
Lw

are
@

Ln
Lw

@
> 0;
@

Ln
Lw

@
D
@

Ln
Lw

@
< 0;
@

Ln
Lw

@
> 0;
@

Ln
Lw

@
< 0;
@

Ln
Lw

@
8>><>>:
 0 for   
< 0 for 0   < 
where  D 
2 2C
q
8 2C. 2 2/2
4 > 0
Proof. See Appendix.
Increased uncertainty ( ) about the bank’s expected discounted loss from fore-
closing on and charging off the non-performing loan increases the value of the
option to wait. This raises the trigger value associated with the foreclosure and
charge-off decision and thus increases the bank’s tendency to delay it. Such un-
certainty would stem largely from variability in the market for collateral, which
for many loans will depend heavily on real estate prices. An increased (adjusted)
trend () in the bank’s expected discounted loss from pursuing the loan fore-
closure and charge-off process has the opposite effect on its willingness to go
ahead with it; this could reflect long-term (downwards) developments in the mar-
ket for collateral (), worsened general economic conditions (as proxied by ),
or a combination of these two. The stronger the degree () to which economic
conditions affect that trend, the stronger the bank’s tendency to delay the loan
foreclosure and charge-off decision.
Increasing the risk-adjusted or discount rate () reduces the potential future
benefits from postponing the process of loan foreclosure and charge-off, and thus
leads to lower values of both the option to wait and the associated trigger value.
An increased probability of loan recovery () could either lead to lower or higher
values of the option to wait and the associated trigger value, depending on the
level of the parameter . For low enough levels of , i.e.  < ,11 a higher
11One can further show that @

@ < 0,
@
@ > 0 and
@
@ < 0.
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Figure 1: Trigger value as function of  and  (for  D 0,  D 0:05 and  D 0:5)
probability of loan recovery, as plausibly driven by better economic conditions,
could lower the potential future gains from delaying the process of loan foreclo-
sure to the point of leading to overall lower values of the option to wait and the
associated trigger value. This counterintuitive implication disappears, however,
for large enough levels of , i.e.  > , generating the more intuitive result that
banks’ discretionary tendency to delay the loan foreclosure and charge-off process
is strengthened by better general economic conditions increasing the chance for
loan recovery, in addition to being also magnified by more variability in the market
for collateral.
These results are illustrated in Figures 1 and 2 where we simulated the trigger
values

Ln
Lw

as functions of  , ,  and . We note the potentially very sig-
nificant magnitudes of those trigger values; this demonstrates the importance of
variability in the market for collateral and general economic conditions affecting
the chance for loan recovery for banks’ discretionary behavior in loan charge-offs.
The main policy implication of our model is therefore that when a bank has the
leeway to exercise discretion in the timing of its loan charge-offs, it can properly
take into account the real options value implicit in the loan charge-off decision,
which can be of a substantial magnitude; a welfare maximizing regulator might
10
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Figure 2: Trigger value as function of  and  (for  D 0:1;  D 0:2 and  D 0:5)
generally approve of banks pursuing this kind of discretionary, optimizing behav-
ior.
3 Empirical analysis
3.1 Methodology and data description
In Section 2 we demonstrated that banks’ discretionary behavior in charging off
non-performing loans might generally be related to variability in the market for
collateral and general economic conditions. We test this hypothesis of "uncer-
tainty dependence" in loan charge-offs, while controlling for possible capital man-
agement and income smoothing behavior as discussed in the introduction, using
a panel of European commercial, savings and cooperative & mutual banks over
the period 1994 to 2005. Annual information on our core variables of interest
(in particular net charge-offs, loan loss reserves and total capital ratio), which we
extracted from BvD BankScope, is available only for 224 banks out of a Euro-
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pean total of 4853 (with 1 in Austria, 4 in Germany, 138 in Italy, 19 in Norway,
13 in Portugal, 39 in Spain and 10 in the UK). Table 1 gives some descriptive
statistics for both our dataset and the full European sample of banks available in
BankScope.
[Insert Table 1]
We represent general economic conditions by the output gap (GAP j t ), calcu-
lated on quarterly GDP data using a standard Hodrick-Prescott filter to compute
the output trend. We further proxy the discount rate with the three-month in-
terbank rate (R3M j t ); both the GDP and the interest rate series are provided by
Datastream International.
Variability in the market for collateral should be related to that in the real
estate market, so we use returns on real estate stock indices as a proxy; this choice
is motivated by the fact that we extract conditional volatilities with a GARCH
procedure,12 which requires higher frequency data. The GARCH.1; 1/ estimated
using weekly data for each country j has the specification
RESt D  C RMt C "t (2)
ht D $ C  "2t 1 C ht 1 (3)
where RESt is the return of the national real estate stock index, and RMt the return
of the national market index provided by Datastream International.
Equation (2) specifies a single-factor market model to characterize the con-
ditional mean of the return of the national real estate stock index as the fitted
values ORESt . Equation (3) is the GARCH.1; 1/ representation of the conditional
variance, characterizing the current fitted variance ht . We assume conditionally
normal errors and use a quasi-maximum likelihood method with robust standard
12The GARCH (Generalised Autoregressive Conditionally Heteroscedastic) model, developed
by Bollerslev (1986), is a widely used, parsimonious way to model (financial) time-series with
time-varying volatility where volatility occurs in clusters (i.e. is "autocorrelated").
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errors13 to estimate the model.14 The weekly conditional means and conditional
standard deviations are averaged and annualized as series M j t and
p
H j t , respec-
tively; these are interpreted as corresponding to the adjusted trend () and uncer-
tainty ( ) characterizing the bank’s expected discounted loss from pursuing the
loan foreclosure and charge-off process.
We then estimate the following equation to determine the impact of variability
in the market for collateral and general economic conditions on banks’ net charge-
offs
NCOi t D 1NCOi t 1 C 2NPLi t 1 C 3TCRi t 1 C 4M j t C 5
p
H j t
C 6GAP j t CC7R3M j t C 8GAP j t  ISmoothi t C  i C i t (4)
where NCOi t is the ratio of net charge-offs to gross loans of bank i ; we introduce
a lagged dependent variable to allow for the fact that charging-off a portfolio of
non-performing loans may have an intertemporal dimension.
We also include several bank specific control variables, as in the related work
of Moyer (1990), Beatty et al. (1995), Collins et al. (1995), Kim and Kross
(1998), and Liu and Ryan (2006). Loan losses are controlled for by the lagged
ratio of non-performing loans to gross loans (NPLi t 1); this variable should have
a positive impact on net charge-offs. We also include the lagged total capital ratio
(TCRi t 1) to allow for possible capital management. Banks might be able to in-
crease their regulatory capital by decreasing their net charge-offs, which increases
their loan loss reserves; the sign of the coefficient associated with the variable
TCRi t 1 is then positive if banks exercise discretion over current loan charge-offs
to increase their regulatory capital when it is at a relatively low level in the previ-
ous period.15
13See Bollerslev and Wooldridge (1992).
14We also ascertain the appropriateness of the GARCH(1,1) specification by testing each coun-
try model for joint significance of the GARCH parameters, and the absence of further autoregres-
sive conditional heteroskedasticity in the residuals, using an ARCH LM test (Engle, 1982).
15With Basel I in force during our sample period, this effect should be limited; see footnote 5.
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Furthermore, Liu and Ryan (2006) observe that banks that try to smooth their
income could attempt to obscure this behavior by trying to minimize fluctuations
in loan loss reserves, in order to avoid regulatory and market scrutiny. This could
be achieved through exercising discretion over loan charge-offs, e.g. by acceler-
ating charge-offs to offset higher loan loss provisions to keep loan loss reserves
unchanged. We control for this effect by including an interaction term between
the output gap (GAP j t ) and an index of the variability of banks’ loan loss re-
serves (ISmoothi t ), which we construct as the difference from the sample mean
of the inverse standard deviation of banks’ loan loss reserve to gross loans ra-
tio, as calculated using three-period moving windows. Banks obscuring their
income smoothing over the cycle through discretionary charge-offs will display
lower variability of loan loss reserves; in this scenario, our interaction term would
have an expected positive sign, as it captures the discretionary net charge-offs of
banks that both smooth their income and try to obscure this behavior as a function
of the current economic condition.
For the variables suggested by the real options framework in Section 2, reflect-
ing the variability in the market for collateral and general economic conditions,
we then expect negative signs on the coefficients for the conditional means (M j t )
and conditional standard deviations (pH j ), a positive sign for the three-month
interbank rate (R3M j t ), whereas we are agnostic regarding the sign for the output
gap (GAP j t ).16
3.2 Estimation results and discussion
Our Equation (4) contains a lagged dependent variable and two variables esti-
mated using a GARCH procedure, thus containing measurement error. We there-
fore estimate it by Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), using two-step ver-
sions of the estimators relying on first-differences (Arellano and Bond, 1991) and
16Note that higher trigger values imply lower contemporaneous loan charge-offs, leading us to
expect the opposite of the signs given for  ,  and  in Proposition 2. The implied sign for the
(adjusted) trend in the (net) value of collateral is the same as that for  and  in Proposition 2,
however, as these are defined in terms of expected discounted losses from the loan charge-off.
14
orthogonal deviations (Arellano and Bover, 1995) to remove cross-section fixed
effects; our estimations are robust to cross-sectional variation in the time series
correlation structure.17 We verified that the correlations between our explanatory
variables are weak, performed Sargan tests of overidentifying restrictions to check
on the validity of our instruments, and checked for absence of second-order serial
correlation in the first-differenced residuals, which is required for consistency of
the first-differences estimator used.
Table 2 presents the results for the estimation of Equation (4) using our two
alternative estimators. The variable controlling for loan losses, NPLi t 1, has a
significant positive impact on net charge-offs, as expected. The coefficient on the
lagged dependent variable NCOi t 1 is similarly positive and significant, demon-
strating the intertemporal dimension of banks’ charge-off behavior. The coeffi-
cient on the lagged total capital ratio TCRi t 1 is not significant; this suggests that
the hypothesis that banks manage their regulatory capital using loan charge-offs is
not valid for our sample of European banks, reflecting their significantly reduced
leeway to do so under Basel I regulations. The coefficient on the interaction term
GAP j t  ISmoothi t is only significant using orthogonal deviations; as it is positive
in this case, our results are (weakly) supportive of the mechanism described by
Liu and Ryan (2006), whereby banks that try to smooth their income attempt to
obscure this behavior by exercising discretion over loan charge-offs.
Our empirical results confirm further the "uncertainty dependence" hypothesis
that banks display discretionary behavior in loan charge-offs which is related to
variability in the market for collateral and general economic conditions. The coef-
ficients for the conditional means M j t and conditional standard deviations
p
H j t
are both significant and negative; both higher growth and uncertainty in the real
estate market thus lead to lower levels of contemporaneous net charge-offs. We
find a significant negative relationship of the output gap GAP j t on net charge-offs;
this is consistent with the case where    in our model, confirming the (in-
17Note that the lagged variables and GMM used almost halve the numbers of observations that
would be usable under simple OLS.
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tuitive) prediction that banks show greater inertia in charging off non-performing
loans when economic conditions are relatively good. Finally, the coefficient on the
three-month interbank rate R3M j t is significant and positive, further illustrating
the intertemporal dimension in banks’ loan charge-off behavior.
These results thus confirm the existence of a discretionary, uncertainty-related
element in the way European banks charge-off non-performing loans, which is
consistent with the main features highlighted in our theoretical model; welfare
maximizing regulators should generally approve of banks pursuing their loan
charge-off process in such a fashion. Capital management does not appear to
play a significant role in European banks’ net charge-off behavior. However, our
results are indicative of the possibility that European banks could be smoothing
their income while attempting to obscure this behavior through matching discre-
tionary loan charge-offs. From a regulator’s point of view, it might thus in practice
be difficult to distinguish the (desirable) uncertainty-related element in European
banks’ loan charge-off behavior from the much less desirable income smoothing
one. A more rules-focused accounting standards setter, on the other hand, would
presumably equally disapprove of both types of discretionary behavior.
[Insert Table 2]
3.3 Robustness and further issues
We examine the robustness of our estimations along two dimensions.18 As the
capital management hypothesis could be more relevant for poorly capitalized
banks, we replace the total capital ratio TCR with a normalized total capital ra-
tio measure, defined as TCR 88 for the first quartile of TCR and 0 otherwise, to test
if this hypothesis holds only for those poorly capitalized banks; our results are
unchanged, with the coefficient still being insignificant.
Given that Italian banks are heavily represented in our sample, we check
whether our results might be an purely Italian phenomenon by running our Equa-
18Details are available from the authors on request.
16
tion (4) on a sample excluding those Italian banks. The results for the three key
variables reflecting our "uncertainty dependence" hypothesis, i.e. the conditional
means M j t , the conditional standard deviations
p
H j t and the output gap GAP j t ,
are unchanged, with only the coefficient on the three-month interbank rate R3M j t ,
less crucially, turning out insignificant.
We then further examine whether small and large banks show differences in
discretionary loan charge-off behavior.19 To this end we augment Equation (4)
with interaction terms between M j t ,
p
H j t , GAP j t and R3M j t (i.e. all four vari-
ables of our "uncertainty dependence" hypothesis) and a bank size dummy vari-
able (Dumsm) (see Table 3). We observe that large banks’ behavior is consistent
with our previous results, with the coefficients on the four variables of our "uncer-
tainty dependence" hypothesis similarly significant and displaying identical signs.
Performing Wald tests on the joint significance of the four interaction terms, we
find that small banks’ behavior in this regard appears significantly different. Fur-
ther Wald tests indicate that, apart from the coefficient on GAP j t which is not
significantly different from the one for large banks, the loan charge-off behavior
of small banks is not well described by our "uncertainty dependence" hypoth-
esis; this could be explained by the fact that small banks might generally have
less margin for such discretionary behavior. We also interact the interaction term
GAP j t  ISmoothi t with our bank size dummy; we find that only small banks’
net charge-off behavior could be affected by their desire to obscure their income
smoothing behavior.
[Insert Table 3]
4 Conclusion
The previous literature on banks’ motivation to pursue discretionary loan charge-
offs has mostly focused on the issues of capital management and income smooth-
ing. Both of these objectives are likely to be considered as undesirable by both
19We have 85 (139) banks with total assets larger (smaller) than 1 billion euros.
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welfare-maximizing bank regulators and transparency-seeking accounting stan-
dard setters. We stress the importance of a potential third rationale for a discre-
tionary approach to the timing of a bank’s loan charge-offs that is related to the
real options nature of that decision in a context of uncertainty.
To examine this "uncertainty dependence" aspect, we develop a stylized real
options model of a bank’s decision whether to foreclose on and charge off a non-
performing secured loan when there is a chance of loan recovery and the expected
present (net) value of potentially reclaimed collateral is uncertain. We find that
increased uncertainty about the value of collateral increases the bank’s tendency
to delay the process of loan foreclosure and charge-off. A loan recovery becom-
ing more probable, e.g. when general economic conditions improve, can either
reduce or, more intuitively, increase the bank’s incentives to hold back on the loan
foreclosure and charge-off process; this depends on the extent to which economic
conditions impact on the trend in the market value of collateral.
The main message of our model is that when a bank has the leeway to exercise
discretion in the timing of its loan charge-offs, it can properly take into account
the real options value implicit in the loan charge-off decision. Such discretionary
loan charge-off behavior might thus be in line with a welfare maximizing regula-
tor’s objectives, although it might be difficult to distinguish from the one driven by
capital management and income smoothing objectives; a more rules-focused ac-
counting standards setter would most likely be opposed to the lack of transparency
in this approach.
Our theoretical model implies the empirical hypothesis that banks’ discre-
tionary loan charge-offs might show a degree of "uncertainty dependence"; we
empirically test this using a panel of European banks over the period 1994 to
2005, controlling for the two other potential types of discretionary loan charge-
off behavior related to capital management and income smoothing objectives. Our
results confirm the existence of a discretionary, uncertainty-related factor in Euro-
pean banks’ loan charge-off behavior, which is consistent with the main features
highlighted in our theoretical model. Our results also show that European banks
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might possibly be smoothing their income by using matching discretionary loan
charge-offs in an attempt to obscure this behavior. The loan charge-off behavior
of European banks does, however, not seem to be driven by a capital manage-
ment objective; this is not very surprising given the limited ability to do so more
generally from Basel I onwards.
Overall, banks’ loan charge-off behavior appears to be a complex process in-
fluenced by various considerations, some of which are unobservable management
objectives. Bank regulators might in this context face a difficult trade-off: on
the one hand, they might want to leave banks enough discretion to allow them to
properly account for the real options values implicit in their loan charge-off de-
cision making under uncertainty. On the other, they might have an incentive to
limit as much as possible the possibility that loan charge-offs are to a large extent
timed in order to essentially "deceive" regulators; in this their incentives would
largely coincide with those of accounting standards setters. This regulatory trade-
off is all the more relevant as it may have an impact on the banks’ intertemporal
loan supply more generally; this might indicate a promising direction for future
research.
A Appendix
Proof. (Proposition 1) For the bank, not to foreclose on and charge off the non-
performing loan for a further instant dt is optimal in the continuation region of
the optimal stopping problem eq. (1), giving the relevant Bellman equation as
F.Ln; Lw/ D 1dt E[d F.Ln; Lw/]. Applying Ito’s Lemma, noting that the value
function F.Ln; Lw/ should be homogeneous of degree 1,20 so that F.Ln; Lw/ D
Lw f .0/ where 0  LnLw , we obtain 12  202 f 00.0/   .   /0 f 0.0/ C .  
   .1 C // f .0/ C  f .0/ D 0 as the differential equation that character-
izes the evolution of f .0/ in that region. We solve by standard methods, us-
ing the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions f .0/ D 0   1 and
20This adopts the solution strategy in Dixit and Pindyck (1994, p. 210).
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@ f .0/
@0 D 1; imposing the convergence condition21  C     > 0, where
 D    , and applying the boundary condition f .0/ D 0, we obtain 0 D
 2 2C4.C/C
q
8.C/ 2C.2  2/2
4.C/ > 1 as the critical (trigger) value 0 D

Ln
Lw

of relative expected discounted losses;22 it separates the region in .Ln; Lw/ space
where the bank’s option to foreclose on and charge off the non-performing loan re-
mains unexercised (i.e. for LnLw <

Ln
Lw

) from the one where immediate exercise
of that option is perceived as optimal (i.e. for LnLw 

Ln
Lw

).
Proof. (Proposition 2) We obtain @

Ln
Lw

@ D 2 .C/ .1 C 2 .2 .C/ /C
2p
9
/ > 0,
with9  8 .C /  2C 2    22 > 0 and 2 .C /  > 0 by assumption.
Also,
@

Ln
Lw

@ D
@

Ln
Lw

@ D   12 .C/.1   2 
2p
9
/ < 0, as bp
aCb2 < 1 for a > 0.
Analogously,
@

Ln
Lw

@ D 2 .C/ .1  2 
2p
9
/ > 0.
Further,
@

Ln
Lw

@ D  
p
9
4 .C/2 .1  
4 .C/  2C 2  2p9
9 / < 0. This holds as
the (expanded) term in brackets is of form 1   aCb
p
b2C2a
b2C2a , and thus positive if
aCb
p
b2C2a
b2C2a < 1. As a > 0, this implies b
p
b2 C 2a < b2 C a; this holds trivially
for b  0, and implies b2  b2 C 2a <  b2 C a2 for b > 0 which also holds.
Lastly,
@

Ln
Lw

@ D  
4 .C/ .2  2/Cp9 .C/ .2 .2C/C 4  C2 .2C/ 2p
9
/
4 .C/2 . In order
to sign this expression, one can solve the equation
@

Ln
Lw

@ D 0 for  to obtain the
unique positive real root  D 
2 2C
q
8 2C. 2 2/2
4 > 0 (as bC
p
a C b2 > 0
for a > 0). As one can also show that @

Ln
Lw

@ D
@

Ln
Lw

@ < 0 holds for  D 0, with
lim!1
@

Ln
Lw

@ D 1, it follows that
@

Ln
Lw

@  0 for   , and
@

Ln
Lw

@ < 0 for
0   < .
21This is sufficient to ensure real roots.
22Note that 0 > 1 holds as b Cpa C b2 > 0 for a > 0.
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 Table 1.  Descriptive statistics for European commercial, savings and cooperative & mutual banks, on average over the period 1994-2005 
 DEPOSIT LOAN PE ROA ROE NIM NNIR EQUITY TCR LLP NCO NPL TA 
Full sample of  banks available under Bankscope (4853 banks) 
 Mean 54.85 53.60 1.56 0.64 7.27 3.06 29.14 9.87 17.70 1.00 0.57 6.67 5354229 
 Minimum 0 0 0 -37.34 -95.39 -4.88 -98.37 0.10 0.10 -50.00 -0.88 0 36 
 Maximum 99.81 99.00 23.75 39.83 97.01 76.69 187.27 98.80 79.00 97.26 9.91 39.98 1.33E+09 
 Std. Dev. 24.21 24.11 1.41 1.91 10.27 2.26 24.00 11.20 9.36 3.38 1.03 6.45 36915223 
Our sample (constrained by availability of net charge-offs, total capital ratio and loan loss reserves) 
All banks (224 banks) 
 Mean 55.87 61.75 1.34 0.81 10.36 3.06 25.56 8.83 14.95 0.50 0.45 5.33 40620937 
 Minimum 0.39 6.94 0.12 -15.97 -53.39 0.43 -36.51 2.08 3.10 -1.22 -0.63 0.00 39099 
 Maximum 87.38 98.13 2.45 4.53 37.82 7.91 80.35 33.23 61.27 27.21 3.55 33.10 9.92E+08 
 Std. Dev. 15.82 18.00 0.37 0.90 7.15 0.96 14.30 3.87 6.74 1.30 0.54 4.96 1.27E+08 
 Mean 1994-1999 58.56 52.62 1.63 1.01 11.00 4.29 25.17 9.36 16.73 0.72 0.70 5.29 16907945 
 Mean 2000-2005 52.50 61.99 1.41 0.79 7.38 3.20 21.35 11.07 17.98 0.47 0.33 7.65 17721361 
 
Variable definitions (all ratios are expressed in percentages): DEPOSIT = deposits/total assets; LOAN = gross loans/total assets; PE=personnel expenses/total assets; 
ROA = return on average assets; ROE = return on average equity; NIM = net interest margin; NNIR = net non-interest revenue/total operating income; EQUITY = 
equity/total assets; TCR = total capital ratio; LLP= loan loss provisions/gross loans; NCO = net charge-offs/gross loans; NPL = non performing loans/gross loans; TA = 
total assets in thousands of euros.  
 
 
Table 2. Determinants of banks’ charge-off behavior (Arellano and Bond (1991) 
and Arellano and Bover (1995) estimators)   
 
 
 
Arrellano and Bond 
(First differences) 
Arrellano and Bover 
(Orthogonal deviations) 
it 1
( )
NCO 

 0.089*** (16.737) 
0.124*** 
(13.697) 
it 1
( )
NPL 

 0.019** (2.430) 
0.024*** 
(5.266) 
it 1
( )
TCR 

 -0.003 (-0.525) 
0.002 
(0.305) 
jt
( )
M

 -0.013*** (-10.353) 
-0.011*** 
(-25.373) 
jt
( )
H

 -0.004*** (-11.417) 
-0.005*** 
(-5.383) 
jt
( )
GAP

 -0.029*** (-3.655) 
-0.050*** 
(-8.008) 
jt
( )
R3M

 0.033*** (8.005) 
0.024*** 
(9.307) 
jt it
( )
GAP ISmooth


 0.001 (1.523) 
0.003** 
(2.488) 
J-Statistic 
(P-value, Sargan test) 
55.662 
(0.412) 
55.497 
(0.380) 
Observations 481 481 
 
***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively; T-statistics are given in 
brackets. Variable definitions: itNCO = ratio net charge-offs/gross loans ; itNPL = ratio non-
performing loans/gross loans; itTCR = total capital ratio; jtM and jtH  = conditional mean and 
conditional standard deviation from a GARCH(1,1) single factor market model of real estate stock 
index returns; jtGAP = output gap, using a Hodrick-Prescott filter; jtR3M = three-month interbank rate; 
itISmooth = difference from sample mean of inverse standard deviation of banks' loan loss reserve to 
gross loans ratio, calculated using three-period moving windows. 
Table 3. Uncertainty dependence hypothesis by banks’ size (Arellano and Bond 
(1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995) estimators)   
 
      
 
Arrellano and Bond 
(First differences) 
Arrellano and Bover 
(Orthogonal deviations) 
it 1NCO   
0.083*** 
(7.152) 
0.123*** 
(11.062) 
it 1NPL   
0.027*** 
(3.825) 
0.020** 
(2.532) 
it 1TCR   
-0.003 
(-0.419) 
0.003 
(0.518) 
jtM  
-0.015*** 
(-16.047) 
-0.012*** 
(-17.577) 
jtH  
-0.005*** 
(-11.728) 
-0.004*** 
(-3.562) 
jtGAP  
-0.038*** 
(-2.679) 
-0.055*** 
(-5.398) 
jtR3M  
0.045*** 
(9.352) 
0.030*** 
(9.385) 
jt itGAP ISmooth  
-0.008*** 
(-3.846) 
-0.007*** 
(-2.965) 
jtsmDum M  
0.013*** 
(3.696) 
0.011*** 
(3.709) 
jtsmDum H  
0.008*** 
(3.501) 
0.007** 
(1.963) 
jtsmDum GAP  
-0.002 
(-0.036) 
0.030 
(0.838) 
jtsmDum R3M  
-0.101*** 
(-4.802) 
-0.074*** 
(-4.124) 
sm jt itDUM GAP ISmooth   
0.015*** 
(3.340) 
0.011*** 
(2.911) 
J-Statistic 
(P-value, Sargan test) 
45.775 
(0.715) 
25.106 
(0.999) 
Observations 481 481 
 
***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively; T-statistics are given in 
brackets. Variable definitions: itNCO = ratio net charge-offs/gross loans ; itNPL = ratio non-
performing loans/gross loans; itTCR = total capital ratio; jtM and jtH  = conditional mean and 
conditional standard deviation from a GARCH(1,1) single factor market model of real estate stock 
index returns; jtGAP = output gap, using a Hodrick-Prescott filter; jtR3M = three-month interbank 
rate; itISmooth = difference from sample mean of inverse standard deviation of banks' loan loss 
reserve to gross loans ratio, calculated using three-period moving windows; smDum = dummy 
variable which is 1 if the average of total assets of the bank over the period 1994-2005 is smaller than 
1 billion euros, and 0 otherwise. 
